My most recent working paper—Economic theory of non-territorial unbundling—is now up on SSRN here.
Abstract: We introduce the case for non-territorial unbundling by taking a discursive approach through public choice and evolutionary economic theory. The argument begins with an appreciation of the many paradoxes and problems of majoritarian voting and proceeds to explore the theory of non-territorial and unbundled governance as means to improve political choice. I find that decoupling political jurisdiction from geographical location (so that citizens can switch political jurisdictions without switching location) and unbundling government (so that collective goods and services can be provided separately by independent public enterprises) will result in greater diversity of governmental forms, a wider range of choice for groups and individuals, and ultimately, better governance. Moreover, I contend that not all bundling should be ruled out; rather, the point is to create an ‘unbundleable’ system of governance and allow political entrepreneurs to discover ways to rebundle functions. Experimentation with bundling, unbundling, and rebundling of the various services states offer elicits the discovery of optimal bundling options for the diversity of citizen preferences.
Keywords: non-territorial, unbundling, public goods, club theory, political choice.